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The problem of determining what uses of the public streets
entitle the abutting owners to compensation, while not new in
itself, is constantly recurring in new phases. This is due in a
large degree to the variety of uses to which our streets are sub-
jected, incident to the constant growth and development of our
large cities ; - the perfection of our telegraph, telephone, sewer
and rapid transit systems constituting the principal servitudes not
contemplated in the original grant of the easement.
It is doubtless true that the public, operating through its rep-
resentative body, the Legislature, has the power to restrict or del-
egate its authority over streets in any way it sees fit, and, as a
necessary incident to this power, it might "release the public
right by vacating the highway, modify the public use by granting
a right to use the highway for a horse-railroad, or restrict the
public use by granting a right to erect poles or other obstructions
in the highway."a
In the discussion of this question, however, it is assumed that
there is no express grant of power further than what is necessary
for the construction of the railroad itself, and that it does not
follow by necessary implication that this includes the right to
erect poles, wires and other appurtenances.
It seems to be well settled in this country, that the right to
construct and operate a horse-railroad in the ordinary manner,
travel and communication being thus facilitated, is clearly a
proper use of the highway, and it has been generally held that the
abutting owner is entitled to no compensation for damage result-
ing from this use whether the fee is in the public or not. b
a Domestic Tel. & Teleph. Co. v. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344.
b See note to r4 Am. St. Rep. 569.
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In view of this uniformity of decision in the case of horse-
railroads, and the obvious similarity in principle, it can hardly be
doubted that electric roads, operated by the so-called storage bat-
tery system, would likewise be exempt from the payment of dam-
ages. The question then is reduced to this: Are the poles and
wires, necessary for the successful operation of the so-called trolley
system a burden sufficient to entitle the abutting owners to com-
pensation ?
As the slight obstruction to the public use of the street, which
necessarily results from the erection of poles and wires, is a
strictly public damage for which the people should seek their
remedy through the Legislature, it would be well to eliminate that
feature of the question, and determine simply whether the placing
of poles in the street is a taking of private property. Nor does it
seem necessary to distinguish the cases where the fee is in the
city, for this is immaterial. There is no legal cause for complaint
so long as abutting owners are unobstructed in the use and enjoy-
ment of their own property.
In the litigation concerning telegraph and telephone poles and
wires there is a conflict of authority. In some of the States it is
held that they are among the necessary incidents to the public
use of the streets, and the right to erect poles and suspend wires
in a reasonable manner, is paramount to individual rights and no
new servitude. c In others it is held- differently, d the decisions,
however, in both cases depend largely on statute.
An attempt has been made to distinguish the case of poles
and wires for electric railways from those for telegraph purposes,
on the ground that the latter are not used to facilitate the use of
the streets for travel and transportation, whereas the former, by
communicating the necessary power, are directly ancillary to their
use for these purposes. Inasmuch as one of the original uses of
land appropriated for a highway was the transmission of intelli-
gence, and as facility of communication would have the natural
tendency to obviate in a great measure the necessity of travel, it
would seem that this distinction is too fine. And it is significant,
that in the very case in which this distinction is drawn, allusion is
c Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75; Julia Building Ass'c. v. Bell Teleph. Co.,
88 Mo. 258; Irwin v. Gt. So. Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63.
dW. U. Tel. Co. v. Williams, ii S. W. Rep. (Va.) io6; Broome v N. Y. &
N. J. Teleph. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. i4i; Roake v. Am. Teleph. Co., 41 N. J. Eq.
35; Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 507; Dusenbury v. Mut.
Union Tel. Co., ii Abb. New Cases (N. Y.) 440.
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made to the fact "that a telegraph erected by a railroad company
within its location, for the purposes of its railroad, to increase the
safety and efficiency thereof, does not constitute an additional
servitude, but is only a legitimate development of the easement
originally acquired." e
On the whole, therefore, it seems best to discuss the subject of
this article independently of the telegraph and telephone.
In the elevated railroad cases in New York it was held that
the erection in the street of iron posts, necessary for the support
of the tracks, was not a taking of private property, but compensa-
tion was granted on account of interference with the easements of
light and air and possibly access. f
These cases are referred to because the same principles apply
as well in the case of poles used for the purpose of supplying
motive power, as for the support of the tracks, but in the former
case it is evident that no damages could be collected, because
there is no interference with the easements of light and air, and,
with a little care in placing, interference with the right of access
can be avoided.
We now come to the cases on the exact question.
In Mt. Adams and Eden Park Inclined Ry. Co. v. Winslow et
a., g it was held that the change in motive power did not change
the essential character of the road, nor did it materially increase
the servitude; and that poles along the margin of the side-walk
should remain, as they were no more of an obstruction to abutting
owners' land than shade-trees, lamp-posts, hitching-posts and
other similar structures which have been tolerated for centuries.
In Pelton v. The East Cleveland R. R. Co., h this case was
cited and approved, and an Grdinance giving the right to use all
necessary appliances for conducting electricity, was held valid.
On appeal to the Circuit Court, the attempt to obtain an injunc-
tion, on the ground that the running of cars by electricity was a
public nuisance, failed.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Taggart v. Newport
S't. R'y. Co., i held that the act of incorporation, authorizing the use
e Per Durfee, C. J., in Taggart v. Newport St. Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 668.
fStory v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., goN. Y. 122; Lahr v. Met. El. R. R. Co.,
104 N. Y. 268; N. Y. Nat. Bank v. Met. El. R. R. Co., iog N. Y. 66o; Pond v.
Met. El. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 186.
g 3 Ohio Circ't. Ct. Rep. 425. (1888).
A 22 Weekly Bulletin and Ohio Law Journal, 67 (1889).
i 16 R. I. 668.
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of electricity for the operation of a street railroad and the erection
of poles as ancillary thereto, does not impose any new servitude
upon the land, nor did it obstruct the streets within the clause of
the charter forbidding the encumbrance of any portion not occu-
pied by the tracks, such poles not being an encumbrance, but a
necessity, and greatly facilitating the use of the street as a public
way.
This decision was approved in Louisville Bagging Mfg. Co. v.
The Central Pass. R'y. Co.j
In Lonergan v. Lafayette S't. R'y. Co., k it was held that the
Legislature, in the act "to provide for the incorporation of street
railroad companies," probably contemplated new inventions, and
no new servitude was imposed upon the land.
In Michigan, companies are authorized by statute to propel
the cars by "steam or other power," under the authority of the
municipality. The city council of Detroit by ordinance authorized
the use of electricity. In Detroit City Railway v. Mills I it was
held that this did not impose such a new burden and servitude as
to entitle abutting owners to compensation. The authority of
this case is weakened however, by vigorous dissenting opinions
of two of the judges, on the ground that any street railway,
whether operated by animal power, electricity or steam, is a new
burden, and, although a public necessity, one which should be
supplied at public expense. The weight of authority against the
extreme views expressed by the dissenting judges, is so strong,
that it does not seem worth while to consider them at greater
length in the limitations of this article.
The same question was again alluded to in the later case of
Nichols v. The Ann Arbor & Ypsilanti S't. R'y. Co. m The same
judges again dissented, and a third did not concur in that part of
the opinion which stated that it was settled law in that State,
that a street railway operated by steam or electricity is not an
additional servitude.
In Halsey v. Rapid Transit S't. R'y. Co., x it was held that the
general authority to maintain and operate a street railway, no
express words of limitation being used, will carry with it, by
necessary implication, all such powers as are reasonably necessary
j Louisville Law and Equity Court, June, i8go.
k Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Ind., July, I8go.
1 85 Mich. 634.
m 87 Mich. 361.
x 47 N. J. Eq. 380.
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for the successful operation of an- electric railroad, in the present
state of electrical science, and as poles and wires are reasonably
necessary to carry on its business successfully, the right to erect
them is clearly within this implied power.
This was followed by the case of Lockhart v. Craig S't. R'y.
Co., o in which it was held that the operation of an overhead elec-
tric system was a proper use of the streets, and imposed no new
burden on the soil.
Finally in the very recent case of Koch v. North. Ave. R y.
Co.,!i the Court, after citing some of the above decisions, states
as a settled rule of law that the use of electricity imposes no new
servitude.
In this brief discussion it has been shown that the Courts are
decidedly opposed to granting compensation in this and analagous
cases. Taking a somewhat narrow view of the matter it might
be argued that, strictly speaking, the use of our streets for all
purposes of so-called public improvement, without regard to the
rights and feelings of abutting owners, and particularly the erec-
tion of unsightly poles and wires, could not possibly have been
seriously contemplated, or even considered by the original
grantors of the easement, and is not perhaps strictly justifiable.
The undoubted tendency of the courts however, has been to
take a much broader view of the matter, with the result of subor-
dinating strictly private right to public necessity. And with the
increased necessities of our growing cities this view seems on the
whole the most reasonable. Rapid transit in particular is as indis-
pensable to their progress as light, sewerage and water, and a
system which is clean, quiet, cheap, easily controlled and occupy-
ing as little space as possible is universally demanded. It has
been conclusively proved by common experience, that the electric
system has, under favorable circumstances, perhaps all of these
requisites. By it business men, clerks, working men and women
are swiftly carried from the suburbs, where they have cheap and
comfortable homes, to their respective places of business.
From the point of view of the public, these reasons clearly out-
weigh the slight irritation that may be caused to the artistic eye
of the abutting owner by the erection of the necessary appurte-
nances.
But on the other hand the advantage is not all on the side of
the public. In the construction and operation of an electric street
o 139 Penn. St 419.
P 23 Atl. Rep. (Md.) 463. (Jan. 1892).
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railway, nothing is taken which is of itself and alone intrinsically
valuable, but only as its loss affects the adjoining land. Where
however it can be shown, as in fact can be done in the majority
of cases, that, by reason of the location of the road, the abutting
owner has been specially and peculiarly benefitted, his property
being in actual fact worth several per cent more than it was
before, there is no loss affecting the value of the land, but, on
the contrary, a positive benefit. It would then be the greatest
injustice to award to an owner damages, which in fact he never
sustained. To permit a recovery of this conjectural and wholly
theoretical damage, in spite of the obvious benefits conferred,
would be to legalize a mere raid on the treasury of the unfortu-
nate victims.
